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Abstract
At the center of debates on deliberative democracy is the issue of how much real deliberation
citizens experience on a regular basis in their core social networks. These “disagreements about
disagreement” come in a variety of forms, with scholars advocating significantly different empirical
approaches (e.g., Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Mutz 2006), and coming to significantly
different substantive conclusions. In this paper, we tackle these discrepancies through
methodological advances and an investigation into the effects that conceptual differences have on
key findings relating interpersonal political disagreement to political attitudes and behaviors
Drawing on the 2008 ANES panel study, we explore the consequences of making different
assumptions about the definition and measurement of disagreement, ultimately speaking to the ongoing debate over whether a deliberative society can also be a participatory one (Mutz 2006).

Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,
Chicago, IL, May 2010.
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As suggested by Lasswell’s (1936) classic definition of politics – who gets what, when, and
how – conflict is inevitable in any political process. Nevertheless, conflict also seems to be the part
of government and politics most disliked by average voters. At best, regular voters can be
characterized as finding disagreement among elites distasteful (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002), and
with friends uncomfortable (Ulbig and Funk 1996). At worst, disdain for conflict stemming from
clashing points of view may lead to withdrawal from the public sphere, diminishing the relationship
between citizens and policy-makers (Mutz 2006).
In the realm of political behavior, a recent revival of interest in conflict and disagreement
stems from normative theories of political deliberation; these promote a different view of how a
representative democracy functions effectively. Though liberal theories emphasize the need for
resource-endowed individuals to participate, deliberative theories focus on collective processes and
exchange in viewpoints. As a consequence, empirical scholars have devoted significant time and
attention to understanding the behavioral consequences of debate, deliberation, and disagreement
between regular citizens.
Although we have learned that structured deliberative settings produce many of the benefits
identified by normative theorists (Chambers 1996; Fishkin 1995; though see Delli Carpini et al. 2004
for a review and critiques), less is known about the role that everyday discussion – particularly
discussion across lines of political difference – holds for political behavior. Some research indicates
that this form of disagreement between citizens makes minority voters less likely to vote with their
underlying partisanship (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1988; Sokhey and McClurg n.d.), increases opinion
ambivalence (Mutz 2002), and decreases political participation (McClurg 2006a; Mutz 2002; 2006).
Other research shows an opposite effect, suggesting that disagreement does not always disable
engaged citizenship (Huckfeldt et al. 2004; McClurg 2006b; Nir 2005). At present, the literature sits
at an important juncture, with many inconsistencies begging explanation.
2

At the core of this "disagreement about disagreement" are two analytic problems central to
understanding the relevance of social communication for political behavior. One revolves around
the inadequate conceptualization and measurement of the core concept, namely political
disagreement. Although common practice has emerged from earlier research, almost no attention is
given to outlining what is actually meant by disagreement, to developing adequate measures, and to
examining the impact that alternative measurements have on our understandings of political
behavior.
A second set of challenges center on the difficulties present in developing adequate causal
estimates. Klofstad (2007) notes that cross-sectional studies of social communication and political
behavior are likely biased; this can occur both through the self-selection of respondents into particular
networks, and by reciprocal causation between behaviors and discussion. Nickerson (2005) and
Klofstad (2007) lead a growing body of work in demonstrating that general estimates of political
discussion effects are real, but that care must be exercised because of the aforementioned analytic
biases. Unfortunately, the majority of data available for testing theoretical claims about political
disagreement – particularly with nationally representative samples – are cross-sectional, and
therefore not particularly well-suited for addressing these problems.
In the sections that follow, we tackle interpersonal disagreement with an eye on both issues;
we aim to bring conformity to practice and order to previous results. Using matching to address
causal inference, we employ two measures of disagreement that reflect general views about how to
measure the concept: a general measure of how much people believe they disagree with members of
their network, and a second one based on the perceived levels of partisanship of network members.
Using both approaches, we examine how disagreement relates to vote choice and political
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participation in a national sample of Americans from the 2008 American National Election Studies
panel study.1
Social Communication, Political Disagreement, and Political Behavior
Why We Care About Political Disagreement.
Broadly conceived, political disagreement is defined as conversations where those engaged in
discussion are exposed to political viewpoints that are different from their own. Such exchanges are
particularly important for understanding dynamics in political behavior; without the possibility of
learning new information or views, there is little opportunity for social communication to change
past behavior – put another way, disagreement drives the social influence process (McPhee 1963;
Sprague 1982). And, while it may be true that other forms of conversation may still influence
behavior, it seems equally possibly that such discussions serve more in a reinforcing capacity.
More fundamentally, political disagreement is important because it may help us understand
how individual preferences translate into citizen inputs into the political system. When there is no
exchange of views between citizens, the lines of debate are hard and fast, and should inhibit
compromise among representative officials. And, in such a situation, preferences are relatively fixed
and the ability of governments to provide representation becomes largely a function of institutional
design (Dahl 1963). Yet when there is some exchange of views between citizens, public
representation becomes a matter not just of how we aggregate preferences through institutions, but
of how the public reacts to different viewpoints. Indeed, multiple aggregate outcomes are possible,
depending upon the behavioral consequences of encountering difference (Huckfeldt et al. 2004).
For instance, if conflicting views create intolerance for others' preferences, it can
delegitimize governing elites who do not share the ideas of majorities. Conversely, if disagreement
causes some groups of voters (e.g., majority opinion holders) to express their opinions more

1

Future versions of this paper will include data and analyses from the 2000 American National Election Study.
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insistently, or to participate more than others groups (e.g., minority opinion holders), then
government may be more responsive to some groups than others (and on the basis of something
other than the extent to which their beliefs are widely held) (Noelle-Neuman 1993)). It is also
possible that disagreement affects preferences themselves, suggesting that what is in the public's
interest is a dynamic phenomenon that changes as we deliberate, potentially leading to "better"
public opinion (Fishkin 1995) and policy outputs.
What We Know About Political Disagreement.
For all these reasons, there is acute interest in how much disagreement occurs between
citizens in their everyday lives, and in the effects that disagreement has on a variety of political
attitudes and behaviors. However, the answers to these questions have remained ambiguous.
For example, the fundamental question of how much disagreement exists between citizens is
itself contested even in an era of sophisticated polling that allows us to clearly identify a survey
respondent's discussants (Klofstad at el. 2009). Nevertheless, a real debate has emerged over the
typical American’s experience of disagreement. Huckfeldt et al. (2004) have argued that the modal
condition is some disagreement (based upon average network size and various probabilities of
disagreement between any two members); Mutz (2006) makes an argument for low levels of
disagreement – she notes that not only are levels of disagreement between dyads very low in
national probability samples, but that levels of communication in those dyads are also exceptionally
low. In the end, Mutz and Huckfeldt and colleagues look at similar data, but draw largely opposite
conclusions.
Another significant line of debate focuses on the consequences of disagreement. Mutz's
seminal contributions (2002a, 2002b, 2006) on "cross cutting" discussion frame the question clearly:
while disagreement leads to better understandings of and tolerance for different viewpoints, it leads
to lower levels of political participation. In short, she suggests that levels of disagreement force a
5

choice between participatory and deliberative forms of democracy. Yet even while she makes this
argument forcefully, there are indicators that the choice is perhaps not so stark. On the one hand,
some scholars report that disagreement is either positively or statistically insignificantly related to
participation (e.g., Nir 2005). On the other, some scholars suggest that the influence of
disagreement is variable, subject to other elements in a person’s network (e.g., Djupe, Sokhey, and
Gilbert 2007; McClurg 2006a), or the broader social context in which that disagreement occurs
(McClurg 2006b; Noelle-Neuman 1993).
Although the impact of disagreement on some political attitudes and behaviors – for
example, tolerance or ambivalence towards candidates – is not the subject of heated debate, close
examinations of the literature trend toward inconsistencies on these points as well. To a certain
degree, this can be a consequence of different bases of evidence and varying theoretical
predilections. However, as mentioned at the outset, there are two sorts of analytical problems that
might also lead to such a state of affairs – inconsistent conceptualization and measurement of
disagreement, and the problems that arise from cross-sectional, ego-centric data. We now discuss
these problems in more detail.
Analytic Problems in the Study of Political Disagreement
Measuring Disagreement
We argue ambiguities in previous research stem in part from different approaches to the
analysis of political disagreement. The first of these are different conceptualizations of disagreement
and concomitant differences in measurement. Conceptually, almost all political science studies
employ measures that focus on some level of discussion occurring across lines of political difference.
However, this is where the agreement about disagreement ends. This is nicely illustrated by the
measures used in two of the most well-cited studies in the field: Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague's
(2004) Political Disagreement and Mutz's (2006) Hearing the Other Side.
6

Huckfeldt et al. measure disagreement as the absence of agreement in the vote choice of a main
respondent and her discussant. According to their approach, a person who prefers one presidential
candidate encounters disagreement even if their discussant prefers no presidential candidate. There are
many conceptual benefits to such a measurement approach; these include that it is anchored in
political preferences, that it is about an individual’s perceptions of their communication
environment, and that we have a very good sense of what the disagreement is about. At the same
time, the measurement may be appropriately conceived of as measuring the absence of agreement
rather than the presence of disagreement. In turn, this may overstate the importance of social
exchanges with low political salience – exchanges that do not really create significant opportunities
for learning that are central to theories of disagreement and deliberative democracy.
The approach used by Mutz is similar in spirit as she seeks to measure survey respondents’
perceptions of how much they disagree with their named discussants. In practice her measure is
different and implies a different conceptualization of disagreement. Specifically, her approach is to
create an index of disagreement that combines information on a variety of survey questions; these
include shared vote preferences, shared partisan preferences, general perceptions of disagreement,
general perceptions of shared opinions, and levels/frequencies of disagreement. The strength of
this measure is that it does not rely solely on a transient political choice for determining whether
disagreement exists; it focused instead on more general social exchange. Another potential strength is
that this approach measures exposure to disagreement by including levels/the frequency of political talk
in the index, rather than assuming that such disagreement is not reliant on how often interaction
takes place. Nevertheless, we argue that this measure is weighted towards very intense
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disagreements, while overlooking the more common, less intense discussions that may hold
behavioral consequences for voters in the context of an election campaign.2
We see these two measurement approaches – and the conceptualizations that they imply – as
brackets on a range of conversational possibilities that may hold different behavioral consequences.
While the Huckfeldt et al. measure allows for disagreement to occur in any exchange where
agreement is absent (albeit in the context of voting), the Mutz measure is more likely to weigh
intense and persistent disagreements more heavily. Both measures capture political differences, but
the range of conversations they capture (and their consequences) may vary dramatically. For
example, while the Huckfeldt et al. measure would suggest that widespread opportunities for
learning something about politics exist (because there is an absence of support), the more intense
political disagreements that the Mutz measure identifies probably border on conflict, and are therefore
less likely to occur. Additionally, intense disagreement may actually inhibit learning, as a long line of
literature suggests that people seek to avoid it (e.g., Festinger 1957).
At base, we argue that the core difference is whether or not measures are inclusive of nonintense disagreement. Towards that end, we investigate the impact of disagreement through two
measures that capture these elements – a partisanship difference measure (closer to the Huckfeldt
and colleagues approach), and the general disagreement measure (closer to the Mutz approach).3
Our examination is primarily focused on the extent to which these two different measures provide
us with similar or divergent pictures of how disagreement influences political behavior. In short, we
question whether measurement differences are potentially the root cause of the aforementioned,
inconsistent findings in the literature.

2

This is particularly true when we consider that most network questions on surveys solicit information on family and
close friends, or people with whom we are likely biased against thinking that we "disagree" in any general sense. In other
words, pressure towards believing that we are in harmonious relationships may lead to the underreporting of all but the
most significant disagreements.
3 Future work will include an analysis of the vote-difference measure (via the 2000 American National Election Study).
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Disagreement and Causal Inference
Research on political disagreement is explicitly interested in its consequences for political
behavior. However, as membership in social networks – and in particular, disagreeable exchanges –
is not forced upon individuals, the nature of the relationships themselves are the product (to some
degree) of individual choices. The implication of this is that any observed correlations between
political behavior and the content of political discussions is analytically suspect; this is particularly
true for cross-sectional data, where time cannot be leveraged against these processes.
Klofstad (2007) elaborates on this, noting three identification problems in social network
research. The first is the problem of selection bias, where disagreement and discussion in networks is
driven by individuals’ political preferences and behaviors. The second is the problem of reciprocal
causation, where disagreement may affect political behavior, but feedback exists those behaviors to
disagreement. Finally, network researchers also have to be wary of spurious causation, where factors
that lead to political behaviors – e.g., partisan intensity and/or educational level – also lead to the
structure of a social network and certain levels of discussion.
Political scientists have adopted techniques to deal with these problems, and in the
behavioral networks literature, scholars have responded with a combination of experimental design
(Klofstad 2007; Nickerson 2005), and statistical techniques (Klofstad 2007). Here we employ
matching (Ho et al. 2007 for a discussion) – a statistical procedure used to impose experimental
control on observational data – to address several of these hurdles facing the literature. By
conceptualizing disagreement as a treatment, we isolate its effects on behavioral outcomes of
interest. Below we discuss the data, measures, and this methodological tack in more detail.

9

DATA AND METHOD
Our evidence comes from the January 2009 release of the 2008-2009 American National
Election Studies (ANES) Panel Survey (ANES 2009).4 This data set contains information collected
at six different points in time over the course of the year 2008: January, February, June, September,
October, and November. A nationally-representative sample of respondents was recruited to
participate over the telephone, and completed each questionnaire over the Internet. Individuals
without Internet access were supplied with a free web browsing device. Respondents received a $10
incentive for each completed questionnaire. Additional information on how this study was
conducted is available in DeBell et al. (2009).
Independent Variables: Measure of Political Disagreement
In the September, 2008 questionnaire, respondents were asked to identify the members of
their political discussion network through a “name generator” procedure (see Klofstad et al. 2009
for details on similar procedures; see Knoke and Yang 2008 for more on ego-centric data
structures). Specifically, respondents were first asked, “During the last six months, did you talk with
anyone face-to-face, on the phone, by email, or in any other way about government or elections, or
did you not do this with anyone during the last six months?” Those responding in the affirmative (N
= 1225) were asked to name up to four individuals with whom they engaged in such discussion.
Respondents were then asked a series of follow-up questions about each named discussant.
We opertationalize exposure to interpersonal political disagreement in two ways. One
measure is based on the respondent’s perception of how much disagreement is occurring in his or
her network (hereafter referred to as “perceived disagreement”). For each discussant, respondents
were asked, “In general, how different are [DISCUSSANT NAME]’s opinions about government

4 “Note that the 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study is entirely separate from the 2008 ANES Time Series study, which was
conducted using the traditional ANES method of face-to-face interviews before and after the 2008 election. Although
there are a few questions common to both studies, the samples and methods are different” (DeBell et al. 2009, p. 5).
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and elections from your own views: extremely different, very different, moderately different, slightly
different, or not at all different?” We first summed the disagreement scales for each member of the
discussion network (i.e., we created a measure of the total amount of perceived disagreement in the
network). The final disagreement scale is created by dividing the sum of the disagreement scales by
the number of discussants mentioned by the respondent (this is done in order to make the scale
comparable for respondents with differently-sized networks).
Our second measure of disagreement is based on the respondent’s report of the partisan
leanings of her discussants (hereafter referred to as “cross-cutting partisanship). In turn, this
measure is based on the standard ANES battery of questions producing a 7-point partisanship scale
runing from “Strong Democrat” to “Strong Republican.” To construct this partisanship-based
disagreement scale, we subtracted the mean partisanship score of the discussion network – (to get
this we took the sum of the identification scores for all discussants in a network, and divided by the
number of discussants mentioned by the respondent) – from the respondent’s own partisanship
score. Again, the mean of the network is used in order to make the scale comparable for
respondents with differently sized networks. This yields a measure where both larger positive and
negative numbers indicate greater levels of partisan disagreement between the respondent and his or
her discussants. As such, we use the absolute value of this measure as the final scale, where higher
positive values indicate greater disagreement.
Dependent Variables
In the following analyses, we examine the relationship between exposure to disagreement
and a number of different measures of political preferences and behavior. Each of these dependent
variable were gathered in waves of the panel survey subsequent to when the network data were
collected in September, 2008. This temporal separation between the independent and dependent

11

variables (with disagreement measured prior to the dependent variables) increases the precision of
our analysis.
Our first set of dependent variables captures the strength of respondents’ political
preferences. One variable measures how certain respondents were about their 2008 vote presidential
vote choice in October of 2008. Respondents were first asked to predict their vote choice, after
which they were asked, “How sure are you of that: extremely sure, very sure, moderate sure, slightly
sure, or not sure at all?” A second variable measures the strength of respondents’ partisanship in
November of 2008, based on the standard ANES self-identification question that yields a 7-point
scale running from “Strong Democrat” to “Strong Republican.” Strength of partisanship is
operationalized by “folding” the 7-point scale into a 4-point scale that runs from “Independent” to
“Strong Partisan.” Finally, we also examined the relationship between disagreement and strength of
ideology, based on the standard ANES self-identification question that yields a 7-point scale running
from “Very Liberal” to “Very Conservative.” As with strength of partisanship, strength of ideology
is operationalized by transforming the 7-point scale into a 4-point scale that runs from “Moderate”
to “Strong Ideologue.”
Our second set of dependent variables are concerned with how civically engaged
respondents were during the course of the 2008 election. One measure captures media use in
October, 2008 by summing the number of days per week that respondents used television, radio, the
Internet and newspapers for news consumption. A second measure gauges how interested
respondents were in politics during November, 2008 based on the question, “How interested are
you in information about what’s going on in government and politics: extremely interested, very
interested, moderately interested, slightly interested, or not interested at all?” We also examine two
measures of political efficacy in November of 2008. The first measures external efficacy based on
the question, “How much do government officials care what people like you think: a great deal, a
12

lot, a moderate amount, a little, or not at all?” The second measures internal efficacy based on the
question, “How much can people like you affect what the government does: a great deal, a lot, a
moderate amount, a little, or not at all?”
Finally, we also examine two additional measures of political engagement and participation.
The first measures how frequently respondents engaged in political discussion in November, 2008,
based on the question, “During a typical week, how many days do you talk about politics with family
or friends?” Unlike the more detailed discussion network questions administered in September,
2008, this variable is a much simpler indicator of how actively respondents were engaged in political
dialogue. Finally, we also look at voter turnout in the 2008 election, as self-reported in the
November, 2008 wave of the panel.
Method: Data Preprocessing
In order to increase the precision of our analysis, we address the analytical biases discussed
above by preprocessing the ANES data with a “matching” procedure (e.g., Dunning, 2008; Ho,
King and Stuart, 2007a; Ho, King and Stuart, 2007b). Under this procedure the effect of being
exposed to political disagreement is more accurately measured by comparing the attitudes and
behaviors of survey respondents who are similar to one another, save the fact that one was exposed
to disagreement and the other was not; in other words, the idea is that the researcher imposes some
degree of “experimental” control on what is observational data. By comparing the attitudes and
behaviors of similar individuals who were and were not exposed to disagreement, we can be
confident that any observed difference in attitudes and behaviors between them is unrelated to the
factors that the respondents were matched on, and as such, is a consequence of being exposed to
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disagreement instead of some confounding factor.5 More detail on how this procedure was
conducted is included in the appendix.
RESULTS6
Who Is Exposed to Disagreement?
Before examining the effect that disagreement might have on one’s political preferences and
behaviors, we first examine what types of individuals are exposed to disagreeable dialogue. Tables 12 present variables that correlate with exposure to disagreement in one’s political discussion
network; again, these were collected in waves of the ANES Panel Study that occurred before the
network battery was administered (i.e., “pre-treatment”). Disagreement is dichotomized at the
mean disagreement score, where above mean indicates a disagreeable network (the treatment) and
below the mean indicates an agreeable network (the control).
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Table 1 shows the various covariates of perceived disagreement – measured in terms of
general perceived disagreement – in one’s political discussion network. Specifically, the percentages
demonstrate that women are less likely to be embedded in disagreeable networks than men.
Individuals in disagreeable networks are less partisan/ideological, and also have weaker attitudes
about the Republicans and Democrats. However, while their weaker preferences might signal

5

Matching is less precise than a controlled experiment because the procedure does not account for unobserved
differences between individuals who were and were not exposed to disagreement (e.g., Arceneaux et al. 2006). However,
given the extensive set of pre-treatment covariates that were used in the matching procedure (see the appendix), it is
difficult to think of any meaningful unobserved factors that are not accounted for in the analysis. Moreover, unobserved
differences between individuals who did and did not engage in civic talk are likely to correlate with observed differences,
and as such are accounted for by proxy in the matching procedure (Stuart and Green 2008). As such, given that a true
experiment is an extremely difficult (if not impossible) research design to execute for this research question, matching (in
concert with panel data) is arguably a next best alternative.
6

All results exclude individuals who did not report having any political discussants (N = 312, or 20% of the 1567 cases
in the data set).
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political disengagement, individuals in disagreeable networks consume more news media, are more
knowledgeable about politics, are more likely to have donated money to a political or social
organization, are more likely to have attended a meeting about political or social matters, and are
more likely to have recruited someone else to attend such a meeting. As such, the data suggest that
individuals in disagreeable networks are more politically engaged, but more agnostic about their
political leanings when compared to individuals in agreeable networks.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Table 2 examines the correlates of exposure to our second measure, cross-cutting
partisanship. In contrast to Table 1, these data show that individuals embedded in cross-cutting
discussion networks have stronger political preferences than individuals in agreeable networks. As in
Table 1, however, these data also indicate that individuals in cross-cutting networks are more likely
to have engaged in protest behaviors, and are more likely to have distributed political information.
Taken together then, the results in Tables 1 and 2 suggest that individuals who are exposed to
disagreement tend to be more civically engaged and active compared to individuals in more
agreeable networks. However, the data also suggest that general perceived disagreement and crosscutting partisanship are capturing different forms of disagreement; individuals who perceive general
disagreement have weaker political preferences, while individuals who experience measures by a lack
of shared partisan preferences have stronger political preferences.
The Effect of Disagreement on Political Preferences and Behavior
The remaining tables present multivariate analyses of the relationship between exposure to
disagreement in one’s political discussion network, and various measures of political preferences and
behavior. To reduce the analytical biases described in the data and methods section, each of these
analyses incorporated the matching data preprocessing procedure (again, please see the appendix for
a description). The precision of the analysis is also increased by the inclusion of a number of
15

variables that are known to be correlated with political preferences and behavior: demographic
characteristics, strength of political preferences, past patterns of political behavior, and civic
engagement. Each of these variables were measured months before the data on political
disagreement were collected, allowing us to assess the effect of exposure to political disagreement
while controlling for “who the respondent was” – i.e., at the “pre-treatment” stage – before they
were or were not exposed to disagreement.
Strength of Political Preferences
In Table 3 we begin our analysis by estimating the effect of exposure to disagreement on our
measures of strength of political preferences; for each dependent variable, results are presented sideby-side for general disagreement and partisanship-based disagreement. The data in the first two
columns show a positive relationship between exposure to disagreement and being uncertain about
one’s impending vote choice for president, regardless of which measure is used. Substantively, for
example, individuals who perceived general disagreement in their social network are estimated to be
thirteen percentage points less likely to “extremely” certain about their vote choice (a decrease from
72% among those who did not perceive general disagreement, to 59% among those who did so).7
The second measure, cross-cutting partisanship, is estimated to have decreased the likelihood of a
respondent being “extremely” certain about her vote choice by five percentage points (a decrease
from 68% among those who are not in cross-cutting partisan networks, to 63% among those in
cross-cutting networks).
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The next four columns in Table 3 show the relationship between disagreement and strength
of partisan and ideological preferences, respectively. The data show that while we cannot detect a
systematic relationship between exposure to cross-cutting partisanship and strength of political
7

All substantive interpretations of coefficients are estimated holding all other factors in the model at their means. These
estimates were derived using the “setx” and “sim” procedures in the “Zelig” package for R (Imai et al. 2007a and b).
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preferences, we find a significant negative relationship for perceived general disagreement.8
Substantively, individuals who perceived general disagreement in their social network are estimated
to be twelve percentage points less likely to be “strong” partisans (a decrease from 50% among
those who did not perceived disagreement, to 38% among those who did perceive disagreement);
they are estimated to be four percentage points less likely to be “strong” ideologues (a decrease from
20% among those who did not perceive general disagreement, to 16% among those who did
perceive disagreement).
Civic Engagement
Using the same model specification presented in Table 3, Table 4 presents the estimated
relationship between the two measures exposure to disagreement and various measures of civic
engagement. The first two columns of the table show that while we are unable to detect a
relationship between perceived general disagreement and news media usage, individuals in crosscutting partisan networks consumed less news media on the eve of the election in October of 2008.
Substantively, however, the relationship between exposure to partisan cross-pressuring and media
use is quite small – individuals embedded in cross-pressured social networks only consumed six
percent less media content (a decrease from a score of 15.8 on the 28-point consumption scale
among those who were not cross-pressured, to a score of 14.9 for those who were cross-pressured).
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
The next two columns of Table 4 show a negative relationship between perceived general
disagreement and interest in politics; we do not detect such a relationship with partisan crosspressuring.9 Substantively, however, the effect of perceptions of general disagreement on political
interest is very meager. For example, individuals who perceived disagreement in their social network
8

Substituting measures of partisan and ideological strength collected in October, 2008 instead of November 2008
produces comparable results, with the exception of the relationship between perceived disagreement and ideological
strength; the coefficient is negative, but not statistically significant (b = -.14, s.e. = .08; p = .11).
9 The October, 2008 measure of political interest produces comparable results.
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are estimated to be only one percentage point less likely to be “extremely” or “very” interested in
politics (a decrease from 76% among those who did not perceive disagreement, to 74% among those
who did perceive disagreement).10 In the last four columns we do not detect any systematic
relationships between exposure to disagreement and either form of political efficacy.11
Political Discussion and Voter Turnout
Finally, again using the same modeling scheme, we examine the effect that political
disagreement has on rates of political discussion and voter turnout. The first two columns
demonstrate that perceived general disagreement predicts less frequent instances of political
discussion; we do not detect a systematic relationship between partisan cross-pressure disagreement
and political discussion.12 Substantively, the relationship between perceived disagreement and
political discussion is quite small. Individuals who perceived general disagreement in their social
network were only five percent less talkative about politics with their friends and family (a decrease
from 3.8 days per week among those who did not perceive disagreement, to 3.6 days per week
among those who did perceive disagreement). Importantly, in the last two columns of Table 5 we do
not detect any relationship between political disagreement and voter turnout in the 2008 election.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The two measures of interpersonal disagreement from the 2008-09 ANES panel do not map
perfectly onto those used by Mutz (e.g., 2006) and Huckfeldt and colleagues (e.g., 2004). However,
each does capture their essential elements; the general disagreement measure shares much with the
index-based approach of Mutz; the partisanship-based item is similar to the vote-based method. To
10

If we substitute the October measure of political interest for the November, 2008 measure, the result is insignificant
(b = .12, s.e. = .08; p = .13).
11 The same is true is we use October, 2008 measures of efficacy (with the exception of the relationship between crosspressuring partisanship and internal efficacy (b = .16, s.e. = .08; p = .05)_.
12 The October, 2008 measure of political discussion produces comparable results for perceived disagreement, but not
for partisan cross-pressuring (b = -.07, s.e. = .03; p = .03).
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reiterate, we view the essential difference between these two sides as revolving around the extent to
which measures of general disagreement weigh particularly intense conflicts over the more casual
exchanges that are a part of many people’s everyday lives.
Our initial analysis demonstrated that these measures are picking up on different processes –
while the more civically engaged are more likely to experience both types of political disagreement,
those individuals who are exposed to general political disagreement tend to have weaker political
preferences, while those who experience partisanship-based interpersonal political disagreement tend
to have stronger political preferences.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Moreover, as table 6 demonstrates, these two types of disagreement also have distinct effects
across a range of political outcomes. Having pre-processed our data to account for a host of
confounding factors – and using identical specifications for each set of models – we find that the
two “treatments” do not match on direction 1/3 of the time (i.e., for 3 of 9 dependent variables);
they do not match in terms of their statistical significance/insignificance over ½ of the time (i.e., for
5 of 9 models). And, even when the two measures do match in terms of directionality and statistical
significance, they do not match in terms of the size of their effects. For example, we find that
general disagreement has a much larger effect when it comes to decreasing vote certainty relative to
partisanship-based disagreement.
One finding that is particularly noteworthy in-light of the recent debate over disagreement is
the result regarding turnout in the 2008 presidential election. While Mutz (2002; 2006) argues that
disagreement leads to decreased participation (through mechanisms of ambivalence and social
accountability), we find no evidence of such a relationship after accounting for the factors that
potentially select people into certain types of micro-social environments. Moreover, not only are the
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estimates non-significant across both measures of disagreement, but we find that general
disagreement predicts casting a vote, while partisanship based disagreement predicts the opposite.
Taken together, the results reaffirm that networks do produce real political effects
independent of other factors. At the same time, they remind us of a fundamental lesson that has
largely escaped the study of political networks: how we measure concepts matters. Different types
of disagreement not only reflect different social processes (Tables 1 and 2), but appear to have
different effects when it comes to individuals’ political preferences, their patterns of political
engagement, and their likelihoods of political participation. Disagreement does not have simple,
easily characterized effects, and therefore may not be a double-edged sword for democratic practice.
In turn, this suggests that our focus should not be on keeping the good parts of disagreement (i.e.,
those that produce tolerance) while changing or ameliorating the bad (i.e., those that suppress
participation). Rather, we should modify the often-asked question of who experiences disagreement
to consider who experiences what kinds of disagreement.
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APPENDIX
For this analysis, a “full matching” procedure was used (Gu and Rosenbaum, 1993; Hansen
2004; Ho, King and Stuart, 2007a; Ho, King and Stuart, 2007b; Rosenbaum, 1991; Stuart and Green
2008). The procedure was conducted using the “MatchIt” package for R (Ho, Imai, King and Stuart,
2007a; Ho, Imai, King and Stuart, 2007b), which makes use of the “optmatch” package (Hansen,
2004). The ANES Panel Survey data set is tailor-made for matching because subjects were surveyed
about various attitudes and behaviors in waves of the panel (January, February, and June, 2009) that
occurred before they were asked about their political discussion network (September, 2009). Based on
the results presented in Tables 1 and 2, each of the pre-treatment variables that correlated with a
given measure of exposure to disagreement were included in the matching procedure.
The full matching procedure involved three steps. First, study subjects were classified as
either having been “treated” or “untreated” with disagreement. Respondents who were exposed to
an above-average amount of disagreement were classified as having been treated, while those who
were exposed to a below-average amount of disagreement were classified as untreated.13 Second, the
variables included in the matching procedure were used to estimate a score of one’s propensity to be
exposed to disagreement (Hansen, 2004; Ho, King and Stuart, 2007a; Ho, King and Stuart, 2007b).
Third, at least one untreated subject was matched to at least one treated subject based on how close
the propensity scores were between treated and untreated subjects (i.e., a process of creating
“subclasses,” where more than one treated subject could be matched to an untreated subject, and
vice-versa). Each untreated subject was only matched to one treated subject, and vice-versa (i.e.,
matching without replacement). Also, after a subject was initially matched he or she could have been
moved and matched to a different subject before the procedure concluded in order to improve the

13

For the average level of perceived disagreement, this resulted in the classification of 633 treated subjects, and 622
untreated subjects. For cross-cutting partisanship, this resulted in the classification of 517 treated subjects, and 738
untreated subjects.
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overall similarity between the treated and untreated subjects in the data set (i.e., the process is
“optimal” not “greedy”).
The results of the matching procedure were incorporated into the analysis by weighting the
regression models. All treated subjects were given a weight of 1. Untreated subjects were assigned a
weight equal to the number of treated subjects in the subclass that they were assigned to, divided by
the number of untreated subjects in the subclass that they were assigned to. For example, an
untreated subject who was assigned to a subclass with 10 treated subjects and 1 untreated subject
was assigned a weight of 10, while an untreated subject who was assigned to a subclass with 1
treated subject and 10 untreated subject was assigned a weight of .10. Consequently, an untreated
subject who is similar to many treated subjects is given more weight in the analysis than an untreated
subject who was similar to only a few treated subjects. Otherwise stated, applying this weight causes
the regression models to pay more attention to untreated subjects who are similar to treated
subjects, and less attention to untreated subjects who are dissimilar to treated subjects – this makes
the analysis a better comparison between the treated and untreated subjects than if the data were not
weighted.
Table A.1: Improvement in Balance Between Treated and Untreated Cases
Average Perceived
Total Perceived
Cross-Cutting
Disagreement
Disagreement
Partisanship
Overall
99.6%
99.6%
100.0%
QQ Plot Summary Statistics
Median

95.3%

92.7%

96.7%

Mean

93.3%

91.4%

95.5%

85.6%

91.7%

Max
85.3%
Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study

The results presented in Table A.1 illustrate how the matching procedure increased the
similarity, or “balance” (Ho et al. 2007a and 2007b), between subjects who did and did not engage in
disagreement. The first row in the table shows the overall improvement in similarity between treated
22

and untreated subjects, as measured by the subject’s estimated propensity to be exposed to
disagreement (i.e., the propensity score created by the matching procedure). Overall, the similarity in
the propensity to be exposed to disagreement between the “treated” and “untreated” increased by
around 100 percent as a result of the matching procedure. The remaining rows of the table show the
summary statistics from “QQ plots.” QQ plots are two-dimensional graphs which plot the empirical
distribution of a variable among treated subjects on one axis against the empirical distribution of
that same variable among untreated subjects on the other axis. The closer this plotted line is to the
45-dergee line on the graph, the closer treated and untreated subjects are to being perfectly balanced
on that variable. The results in Table A.1 show that the median, mean and maximum distance of the
propensity score QQ plot from the 45-degree line were all greatly improved due to the matching
procedure.
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TABLES
Table 1: Who is Exposed To Disagreement? (Perceived Disagreement)
Type of Network
(09/2008)
Agreeable
Disagreeable
Gender (Female)

59.9%

52.4%

Strength of Partisanship (01/2008)

3.1

2.9

Strength of Ideology (01/2008)

2.7

2.6

2.7

2.4

2.6

2.3

Media Use (01/2008)

15.1

15.8

Political Knowledge (02/2008)

4.0

4.3

62%

68%

54%

61%

29%

34%

Strength of Likes/Dislikes About Democrats
(01/2008)
Strength of Likes/Dislikes About Republicans
(01/2008)

Has Ever Given Money to Organization
Concerned with Political or Social Issue (06/2008)
Has Ever Attended a Meeting About
Political/Social Concerns (06/2008)
Has Ever Invited Someone to a Meeting About
Political/Social Concerns (06/2008)

Difference
-7.5%
(t = 2.66, p < .01)
-.2
(t = 5.31, p < .01)
-.1
(t = 2.02, p = .05)
-.3
(t = 4.15, p = > .01)
-.3
(t = 4.72, p = > .01)
+.7
(t = -2.01, p = .05)
+.3
(t = -3.28, p < .01)
+6%
(t = -2.72, p = .08)
+7%
(t = -2.72, p = .01)
+5%
(t = -2.00, p = .08)

Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study
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Table 2: Who is Exposed To Disagreement? (Cross-Cutting Partisanship)
Type of Network (09/08)
Difference
Agreeable Disagreeable
+.7
Strength of Partisanship (01/08)
2.7
3.4
(t = -12.82, p < .01)
+.2
Strength of Ideology (01/08)
2.6
2.8
(t = -3.80, p < .01)
+.3
Strength of Likes/Dislikes About
2.4
2.7
(t = -5.25, p = > .01)
Democrats (01/08)
+.3
Strength of Likes/Dislikes About
2.3
2.6
(t = -3.88, p = > .01)
Republicans (01/08)
+5%
Ever Joined a Protest, Rally,
28%
33%
(t = -1.82, p = .08)
Demonstration (06/08)
Has Ever Distributed Political
+5%
32%
37%
Information or Advertisements (06/08)
(t = -1.71, p = .09)
Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study
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Table 3: The Effect of Disagreement on Strength of Political Preferences
Vote Certainty
Strength of Party ID
Strength of Ideology
(10/08)
(11/08)
(11/08)
Perceived
X-Cutting
Perceived
X-Cutting
Perceived
X-Cutting
Disagreement Partisanship Disagreement Partisanship Disagreement Partisanship
Exposed to Disagreement
-.32** (.12)
-.16* (.09)
-.21*** (.07)
.02 (.08)
-.20** (.08)
-.06 (.11)
(09/08)
Demographics
Gender (Female)
.02 (.10)
.11 (.10)
.13 (.08)
.17** (.08)
-.001 (.07)
-.10 (.10)
Age
> -.001
-.003 (.01)
-.004 (.003)
.003 (.003)
-.006 (.003)
-.003 (.004)
(.003)
Race (Non-White)
.11 (.14)
-.03 (.15)
.08 (.14)
.05 (.15)
-.19 (.13)
-.19 (.17)
Education
.02 (05)
.04 (.06)
-.04 (.05)
-.04 (.05)
-.03 (.04)
-.03 (.04)
Income
-.003 (.01)
-.006 (.01)
-.01 (.01)
-.003 (.01)
.008 (.01)
.02 (.01)
Strength of Preferences
(01/08)
Strength of Partisanship
.21*** (.05)
.34*** (.05)
.87*** (.05) .86*** (.07)
.23*** (.05)
.26*** (.06)
Strength of Ideology
.20*** (.04)
.21*** (.05)
.22*** (.05) .21*** (.05)
.64*** (.04)
.63*** (.06)
Direction of Preferences
(01/08)
Partisanship (Democrat-.01 (.02)
-.005 (.02)
-.01 (.02)
-.005 (.02)
.03 (.02)
.02 (.02)
Republican)
Ideology (Liberal-Conservative)
-.09***
-.04 (.03)
-.04 (.02)
.05* (.02)
.04* (.02)
-.06*** (.02)
(.02)
Past Patterns of Political
Behavior
Voted in 2004
-.23 (.19)
-.15 (.14)
.31 (.18)
.46** (.18)
.22 (.17)
.15 (.16)
Civic Engagement
Political Interest (01/08)
.18*** (.05)
.20*** (.04)
.09* (.05)
.12* (.06)
.12*** (.04)
.10* (.05)
Political Knowledge (02/08)
.06* (.04)
.03 (.03)
-.03 (.04)
-.07 (.04)
.08* (.04)
.03 (.05)
Akaike’s Information
2644
2366
Criterion (AIC)
N
1225
1225
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (standard errors in parentheses)
Model Type: Ordered Probit (Imai et al. 2007c)
Note: Estimated cut points are not presented.
Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study

2473

2115

2773

2763

1225

1225

1225

1225
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Table 4: The Effect of Disagreement on Civic Engagement
Media Use (10/08)a
Exposed to Disagreement
(09/08)
Demographics
Gender (Female)
Age
Race (Non-White)
Education
Income
Strength of Preferences (01/08)
Strength of Partisanship
Strength of Ideology
Direction of Preferences (01/08)
Partisanship (Democrat-Republican)
Ideology (Liberal-Conservative)
Past Patterns of Pol. Behavior
Voted in 2004
Civic Engagement
Political Interest (01/08)
Political Knowledge (02/08)
Intercept
Adjusted R2
Akaike’s Information Criterion
N

Political Interest (11/08)b

External Efficacy (11/08)b

Internal Efficacy (11/08)b

Perceived
Disagreement

X-Cutting
Partisanship

Perceived
Disagreement

X-Cutting
Partisanship

Perceived
Disagreement

X-Cutting
Partisanship

Perceived
Disagreement

X-Cutting
Partisanship

-.33 (.42)

-.90** (.36)

-.12* (.07)

-.14 (.10)

-.01 (.10)

-.01 (.08)

.01 (.07)

-.08 (.09)

-.48 (.39)
.08*** (.02)
.08 (.49)
-.05 (.27)
.18*** (.05)

-.65 (.47)
.08*** (.01)
.34 (.49)
-.14 (.19)
.16*** (.05)

.08 (.10)
.01* (.003)
.28** (.13)
.02 (.07)
.01 (.01)

.13 (.10)
.01* (.003)
.10 (.10)
.02 (.05)
.01 (.01)

.23*** (.08)
.001 (.002)
.16* (.09)
.10** (.04)
.002 (.01)

.24*** (.08)
.002 (.002)
.15 (.09)
.08 (.05)
-.01 (.01)

.18** (.08)
-.003 (.002)
.39*** (.10)
.07* (.04)
-.001 (.01)

.14** (.07)
-.003 (.003)
.42*** (.10)
.03 (.03)
-.02 (.01)

.22 (.20)
-.11 (.21)

.30 (.28)
-.21 (.26)

.08 (.05)
.11*** (.04)

.13*** (.05)
.10* (.06)

.10 (.05)
.03 (.04)

.14**(.06)
.01 (.04)

.09** (.04)
.06 (.05)

.08 (.06)
.04 (.04)

-.07 (.10)
-.06 (.13)

-.11 (.07)
-.14 (.10)

-.03 (.02)
-.05* (.02)

-.01 (.02)
-.05** (.02)

-.002 (.02)
-.08 (.02)

.002 (.02)
-.08** (.03)

-.02 (.02)
-.05* (.03)

-.02 (.02)
-.06** (.02)

1.24 (.88)

1.29 (.84)

.44** (.17)

.31 (.24)

.34** (.13)

.19 (.17)

.27** (.12)

.24* (.13)

.73*** (.05)

.76*** (.07)

.13** (.05)

.13*** (.04)

.22*** (.06)

.24*** (.04)

.03 (.03)
---

.02 (.05)
---

.01 (.03)
---

.01 (.05)
---

-.02 (.05)
---

-.002 (.03)
---

--2730
1225

--2657
1225

--3173
1225

--3193
1225

--3388
1225

--3384
1225

.58*** (.14)
.47 (1.63)

1.42***
(.24)
.64*** (.19)
1.63 (1.53)

.21
--1225

.22
--1225

1.45*** (.22)

*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (standard errors in parentheses)
Model Type: aOrdinary Least Squares (Imai et al. 2007d); bOrdered Probit (Imai et al. 2007c); cPoisson (Imai et al. 2007e)
Note: Estimated cut points are not presented.
Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study
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Table 5: The Effect of Disagreement on Political Discussion and Voter Turnout
Political Discussion
2008
(11/2008)a
Voter Turnoutb
Perceived
X-Cutting
Perceived
X-Cutting
Disagreement Partisanship Disagreement Partisanship
Exposed to Disagreement
-.06*(.03)
-.02 (.04)
.32 (.27)
-.32 (.24)
(09/2008)
Demographics
Gender (Female)
.06 (.04)
.07** (.03)
.38 (.26)
.45 (.33)
Age
> .001 (.001) > .001 (.001)
.02 (.01)
.02* (.01)
Race (Non-White)
-.01 (.06)
-.03 (.09)
-.02 (.30)
-.14 (.41)
Education
.003 (.02)
.03 (.02)
.22 (.16)
.23* (.13)
Income
.02*** (.004)
.01** (.01)
.02 (.04)
.04 (.04)
Strength of Preferences
(01/2008)
Strength of Partisanship
.02 (.02)
.07*** (.02)
.06 (.15)
.07 (.14)
Strength of Ideology
.02 (.02)
.02 (.02)
.22 (.17)
.20 (.16)
Direction of Preferences
(01/2008)
Partisanship (Democrat-.01* (.007)
-.01** (.01)
-.09 (.06)
-.08 (.06)
Republican)
Ideology (Liberal-Conservative)
-.01 (.01)
-.01 (.01)
-.05 (.08)
-.03 (.08)
Past Patterns of Political
Behavior
Voted in 2004
.12 (.08)
.11 (.09)
2.11*** (.51) 1.79*** (.51)
Civic Engagement
Political Interest (01/2008)
.25*** (.02)
.24*** (.04)
.21 (.14)
.30** (.13)
Political Knowledge (02/2008)
.03*** (.01)
.03 (.03)
.14* (.08)
-.02 (.10)
Intercept
-.16 (.14)
-.34** (.14) -3.21*** (.90) -2.82*** (.88)
Akaike’s Information
5158
5157
639
Criterion (AIC)
N
1225
1225
1225
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (standard errors in parentheses)
Model Type: aPoisson (Imai et al. 2007e); bLogitistic (Imai et al. 2007f)
Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Study

596
1225
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Table 6: Summary of Findings by Types of Political Outcomes
Treatment
Outcome
General
Partisanship-based Directional
Both
Political
Disagreement
Match?
Significant/
Disagreement
Insignificant?
Strength of Political Preferences
Vote Certainty
Negative*
Negative*
Y
Y
Strength of Party
Negative*
Positive
N
N
Identification
Strength of Ideology
Negative*
Negative
Y
N
Civic Engagement
Media Use
Negative
Negative*
Y
N
Political Interest
Negative*
Negative
Y
N
External Efficacy
Negative
Negative
Y
Y
Internal Efficacy
Positive
Negative
N
Y
Other Participatory Activities
Political Discussion
Negative*
Negative
Y
N
2008 Turnout
Positive
Negative
N
Y
Source: 2008-09 ANES Panel Study
Note: *=statistically significant finding
All results come from models estimated on matched data. Please see Appendix A for details.
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